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Product innovation for a juice company and its associated first-mover advantages 
are analyzed.  Stochastic simulation is used to model market size, price, competitive 
intensity, and the likelihood of competitor entry.  Results of moving first allow the 
firm to capture market share, realize first-mover advantages in excess of $2 million, 
and deter competitor innovation.  In addition, the proposed model is flexible enough 
to be applied in other industries. 
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Introduction  
 
Businesses selling consumer goods constantly have to alter their products to meet 
ever-changing consumer demands.  Consumers desire innovative products that 
meet their personal tastes, income levels, or expectations for improving the quality 
of their life relative to existing products.  Firms that recognize these changes in 
tastes can innovate and meet this change in demand with improved products and, 
at least initially, capture a premium over existing products.  As other firms become 
aware of successful innovations, they will try to imitate and drive the price towards 
the competitive equilibrium.  This is certainly true in food and beverage industries.  
Often viewed as a mature market, the demand for food products and beverages is 
relatively well established and existing consumer preferences are well known.  
However, unexpected changes in the U.S. buying habits do occur, such as the recent 
shift for some to a low-carbohydrate diet.  Such shifts in demand create 
opportunities for firms to innovate products that satisfy consumers’ existing taste 
expectations, but that meets their new demands regarding another characteristic 
such as carbohydrate or calorie content.  
 
Innovation in current product lines will create other problems for firms currently in 
the existing product market.  Lomax et al. (1996) indicate that cannibalization 
occurs when the new brand or innovation can be considered a direct substitute for 
an existing brand.  Usually this happens when the new brand is a line extension 
within the same product class.  Executives of food companies have vocalized their 
concern of cannibalizing existing sales.  In 1996, Frito-Lay executives indicated that 
product innovation causing cannibalization of existing sales was ‘something that 
they worry about’ (US Dept. of Justice).  Typically, successful firms will recognize 
that cannibalizing existing sales might be painful in the short term as sales of an 
existing product suffer.  This short-term pain is soothed by the potential long-term 
success of the new product.  Companies realize that even though innovation brings 
with it the risk of cannibalization it is necessary if they want to retain market 
leadership (Tellis and Golder 1996). 
 
For example, in the 1970s there did not appear to be much demand for ‘diet beer.’  
Anheuser-Busch feared creating a new, lower calorie beer would cause sales of its 
largely successful ‘King of Beers,’ Budweiser, to suffer.  Thus, they did not pursue 
creating a new low-calorie line.  It was not until Miller Brewing Company 
introduced Miller Lite in 1972 that it became clear there existed strong demand for 
a lower-calorie beer.  As Miller Lite stole market share from Budweiser, Anheuser-
Busch finally responded with a low-calorie beer, Bud Light.  However, Miller 
brewing had clearly established itself as a strong competitor in this new market.  
Unwilling to make the same mistake again as the low-carbohydrate (low-carb) craze 
came into being in the early 2000s; Anheuser-Busch innovated early and introduced 
a new line meant to minimize the impact on existing sales of Budweiser and Bud 
Light.  They launched their low-carb beer under a different label, Michelob Ultra, Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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and offered it as a premium alternative to Miller Lite.  This successful innovation 
was partially responsible for a 7.9% growth in 2003 second quarter earnings at 
Anheuser-Busch (Lagorce 2003).  
 
Innovators hope that first-mover advantages will allow them to recoup some of the 
costs associated with creating a new product and reward them for facing the 
uncertainty of the new market.  That is, innovators would desire that initially they 
could extract a premium for being among the first competitors in a market (Conner 
1988).  Additionally, they desire that being the first in the market would create a 
degree of loyalty among consumers that result in consistently higher market share 
that is more easily defendable.  Therefore, our objective is twofold:  1) calculate the 
size of first-mover advantages; 2) demonstrate that a first-mover strategy deters 
competitors from innovating.  Using a fruit juice company’s market data (Fresh 
Juice Inc.1), we simulate the benefits and costs associated with introducing a new 
juice product, Genetically Enhanced (GE) Juice2, in an uncertain market.  Results 
indicate that Fresh Juice Inc.’s first-mover advantages are large enough to justify 
entering the uncertain market.  Also by entering the market now, Fresh Juice Inc.’s 
is able to maintain their long-term market share because the probability of 
competitor entry is decreased.  Finally, it is our contention that the presented model 
allows for a better-justified decision regarding the respective firm’s market 
investments in a new product.  Furthermore, this model is flexible enough to 
recognize differences in other markets in terms of the number of firms, start-up 
costs, competitiveness in industry, market share, and pricing responses.   
 
From here, the paper addresses the background of our objective; followed by the 
methods, data, and empirical models applied to meet our objective; next is a 




The purpose of innovation is not to match or beat competitors in a current market 
but to make them irrelevant, thus it is regarded as a business strategy that 
typically leads to success and business growth (Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 
1998; Akhigbe 2002; Kim and Mauborgne 2004).  In addition, product innovation is 
also linked with long-term financial performance and profitability of a firm 
(Comanor 1965; Mansfield et al; Druecker 1971; Capon, Farely, and Hoening 1990; 
Schmookkler 1996).  Product innovation is accompanied by two types of risks, 
technology risk or “will it work” and marketplace risk or “will people buy it” (Tracey 
2004).  This ‘downside’ to innovation has been termed the ‘innovators dilemma’ 
(Christensen 1997).  Both new and existing firms face this additional uncertainty 
                                                           
1 Fresh Juice Inc. is a fictitious name.  The data underlying FJI is based on a case study developed by Gray et al. 
(2005).  The name of the company is changed to protect the proprietary nature of the data. 
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regarding market size.  However, existing firms likely have greater understanding 
of the current market and are potentially more prepared to respond to demand 
changes.  Using data regarding past introductions of innovative products, existing 
firms can model the impact and profitability of product introductions.  This is often 
known as incremental product innovations that lock in current customers (Tracey 
2004).  By making only incremental changes to their existing products during the 
innovation process, firms increase the likelihood they maintain and retain current 
customers.   
 
Conner (1988) extends the innovator’s dilemma through a Stackleberg Leader-
Follower Model on the race for a new patent.  She emphasizes the importance of 
accounting for the potential that existing product sales will be cannibalized by the 
new product.  In addition, if the leading firm introduces a new product with 
uncertain future earnings, the leading firm should consider the potential responses 
of their competitors (i.e. followers) to the new product introduction.  Conner 
concludes that first-mover advantages have an important impact on the payoff and 
the outlay of R&D investment by the leading firm (i.e. leading firms can afford more 
R&D because of first-mover advantages).   
 
Alternatively, it could be the case that a firm is able to imitate and quickly steal 
market share from innovators.  This might cause first-mover advantages to be too 
small to justify their innovation. The uncertainty regarding market size is resolved 
as firms enter the new product market.  Competitors reduce their risk of failure by 
utilizing a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy to capture second-mover advantages.  Second-
mover advantages occur in those industries where research and development costs 
are significant and/or when the possibility for informational spillover exists 
(Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Tellis and Golder 1996; Hoppe and Ulrich, 
Hoppe 2001).  One of the most well documented second-mover advantages was Sony 
beating all competitors to market with their Beta VCR.  Sony was in the VCR 
market before most of their competitors had their VHS VCRs off the drawing board 
(Gilbert 1984).  Sony quickly found out that consumers preferred VHS to Beta, and 
as result, their competitors gained second-mover advantages that dominated Sony’s 
first-mover advantages.   
 
To ensure that first-mover advantages are not dominated, a firm must first quantify 
them.  This will influence an incumbent firm’s investment decision in an uncertain 
market environment.  Uncertainties include the size of the market, the development 
of the market over time, the potential for new entrants, and the impact on the 




This paper focuses on a situation facing an existing firm in the juice industry, Fresh 
Juice Inc. (FJI), in assessing the impacts of introducing a new product, GE Juice.  Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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We aim to identify if the first-mover advantages associated with GE Juice are 
enough to offset the risks associated with entering the market first.  The reality of 
first-mover-advantages is that they only exist if the pioneering firm is able to better 
develop its resources and capabilities through learning curve advantages and 
superior customer resources relative to its competitors (Leiberman and Montgomery 
1998).  Therefore, we assume that FJI is ready to launch GE Juice in the 
marketplace.  We quantify the first-mover advantages via a net present value 
(NPV) simulation model on the investment of GE Juice to see if they justify 
cannibalizing sales and if they act as a barrier to entry for new competitors.  To 
accomplish this we model four key factors: the market size, price, competitive 




A key element in assessing first-mover advantages is correct simulation of the 
market size.  Using historical annual sales data from FJI, we simulate the potential 
market size for GE Juice.  Diffusion models capture the development of a market 
based on a similar product’s life cycle.  In the marketing literature, the most well 
used diffusion model is the Bass Model (Bass 1969).  Bass’ Model is a way to predict 
the market size for a product when few points of historical annual sales data of a 
similar product are available.  The Bass Model captures adoption of a new product 
by consumers through internal factors (e.g. inter-personal) and external factors (e.g. 
mass media communication). 
 
Mahajan, Sharma, and Buzzell (1993) extended the Bass Model to consider the 
impacts of an additional firm entering the market.  In particular, they develop a 
model that assesses market size, sales of incumbent firms, word-of-mouth 
communication, and the substitution effects between differing brands upon entry by 
a competing firm.  They indicate that an improvement to their model would be the 
consideration of the effects of price on the aforementioned impacts.  Although we do 
not explicitly alter the Bass Model, we do consider this suggestion in the context of 
our model.  That is, market size or demand is estimated via the Bass Model, which 




Price in our model is driven by the market size estimation.  In order to forecast the 
price within the model, demand and supply elasticities are needed.  Once again, the 
historical data from FJI is utilized to estimate these elasticities.  Price, market level 
demand, and market level supply of a similar juice product are used in a regression 
model to estimate the price responsiveness of consumers and suppliers.   
 
Pricing responses to product innovation is considered by Bayus and Chintagunta 
(2003).  Their results suggest that price is not used to deter entry into an innovative Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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product market, but rather the innovation itself serves as a deterrent to entry.  This 
is particularly true for current competitors that might be unwilling to innovate for 
fear of cannibalizing sales.  Furthermore, it could be the case that the innovator 
causes further hesitation by competitors because the innovator advertises heavily in 
an effort to create customer loyalty.  Lieberman and Montgomery (1998), note that 
this occurs when customers develop preferences that have been shaped to favor the 
product of the pioneer through the molding of the cost structure of the customer. 
Bayus and Chintagunta (2003) further suggest that an interesting angle to pursue 
would be to attempt to quantify the benefits of pioneering (first-mover) advantages, 




A firm must first address market power of itself and its competitors.  Market power 
is often quantified via a Herfindahl or Lerner index.  These indices require a set of 
data that can often times be proprietary and unavailable to a firm.  Powell (1997) 
developed a framework that takes the logic of economic market power theory and 
applied it to management science to arrive at a relative measure of market power.  
Using historical information on a similar competitor’s product, Powell suggests a 
conjoint regression analysis that models a firm’s market share response to 
competition.  Historical data on a competing product for FJI’s is available and used 




Entry decisions are often times made on some a priori expectation.  Our model 
utilizes the expectations of FJI to capture the value they bring to the firm.  In 
particular, we consider the probability of a competing firm entering the market 
based on FJI’s initial conjecture.  Therefore, the model simulates different market 
situations and these scenarios drive the decision for competing firms to enter the 
market or not.  These entry decisions are contingent on the market power of the 
competing firm and short run profits of the competing firm. 
 
It may be the case that an incumbent firm has undertaken successful product 
research and development, but would wait to introduce the product in the absence 
of competition (Conner 1988).  Here, the firm wants to wait until the existing 
product has reached maturity in its marketing life.  It is competition or the threat of 
competition that would induce firms to cannibalize sales early.  Thus, there has to 
be some benefit associated with introducing the product that exceeds the 
opportunity cost caused by cannibalizing sales of the existing product.  Presumably, 
these benefits come from delayed entry into the new product market by competitors.   
One way in which firms do this is by introducing a new product into the market. By 
broadening their product line, they attempt to preemptively block a competitor’s 
entry into the market (Leiberman and Montgomery 1998). Therefore, we are Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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interested in the impacts that introducing GE Juice will have on competitor entry in 




This paper deals with the issues of how do competitors react and affect a market 
that is relatively stagnant and how does the firm in question protect their market 
position.  Studies have considered these issues using a game theoretic framework 
(e.g. Chen and MacMillan 1992).  Many of these studies only look at the case in 
which 2 to 3 firms are playing the game.  A relatively small number of firms are 
considered due in large part to the complexities of solving for equilibrium within the 
construct of the game.  A potential solution for firms to deal with this problem is to 
look for guidance in the decision making process rather than a closed form solution.  
Simulating the key elements of the problem will allow managers to address this 




FJI is a leader in the finished consumer juice industry.  They have been producing 
and distributing competitively priced high quality fruit juices to leading national 
grocery chains for a number of years (Gray et al. 2005).  While demand for fruit 
juice has remained steady over the last 10 years, the increase in the number of 
competitors continues to place pressure on FJI’s leader status.  The intense 
competition for shelf space and the continuing fragmentation of consumer’s tastes 
and preferences has kept competitors battling each other on price, advertising, and 
packaging just to maintain their market share.  The product development team’s 
latest product, GE Juice, just may be the ticket to give FJI the new competitive 
advantage they need in an industry that has not seen an innovative product in 
fifteen years. 
 
Gray et al. (2005) outlines the necessary data to construct the parameters for 
estimating the simulation model.  ENER Juice is the most recent product launched 
by FJI that has similar characteristics of GE Juice.  This data will serve as the 
historical data for estimating the simulation parameters for market size, demand 
elasticity, and supply elasticity.  FJI has 10 years of price, demand, supply, and cost 
information for ENER Juice.  FJI also has historical information about their 
competitors’ products introduced in response to FJI’s ENER Juice. This data will be 
used in estimating the response of competitors to the introduction of GE Juice. The 
data consists of the number of competitors entering the market and market share of 
competitors relative to FJI’s market share. 
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Empirical Models 
 
Many firms are faced with the decision to invest in an innovative product line.  The 
following empirical models can be incorporated into an existing firm’s investment 
decision tool kit to account for the many facets of uncertainty.  In particular, we 
focus on market size and market competitiveness.  To account for these 
uncertainties, a stochastic simulation model is developed that looks at the NPV 
decision of long-term profits for FJI investing in and marketing GE Juice: 
 
()
() () INV C P M N NPV
t














      (1) 
 
t represents the year GE Juice is marketed over a 10 year period; δ is the discount 
factor for FJI which is 15%; π is the profit received at time t from GE Juice sales 
and is a function of N or the estimated total market size for GE Juice, M is the 
market share of FJI relative to its competitors, P or market price of GE Juice, and C 
is the cost of production; INV is the initial investment outlay for FJI which is 
$1,375,000.  Emphasis is on the long run NPV or the present value of profits, which 
address the long-term viability of the firm.  Therefore, a positive NPV states that 
the discounted profit received from GE Juice is enough to cover the initial 
investment outlay or this investment adds economic profit to FJI and should be 
undertaken.  Attention is now given to the π function. 
 
A modified Bass Model is implemented to have a measurement of the market size or 
more importantly the classic product life cycle curve.  Winston (2000) proposes the 
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t N  is the cumulative product sales 
throughout the product’s life cycle; N represents the long run total number of 
consumers; Φ is the parameter estimate of external influence or people who have 
not yet adopted; θ is the parameter estimate of internal influence or diffusion of the 
product through the market; t ε  is the error term.  It is assumed that all consumers 
will eventually adopt the product.  This allows the market size estimate to be 
treated as demand within the model.  Kumar and Swaminathan (2003) applied the 
proposed modified Bass Model as a way to capture unmet past demand on future Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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demand.  In particular, they focus on a sales-build up plan for a firm and rigorously 
prove this modified Bass Model. 
 
Winston’s (2000) framework for estimating a firm’s market share based on its 
conjectures is derived for FJI.  Using historical information on a similar 
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where Mt is FJI’s share of the market in time period t; Lt is FJI’s long-term share of 
the market, which is based on FJI’s market power (Λ) relative to the power of all 
firms in the market (∑
i
i λ ); λi represents the ith competitive firm’s market power 
relative to the market leader; β measures the decay of the firm’s initial market 
share to the firm’s long-term market share; t µ  is the error term.  Using Powell’s 
(1997) logic to arrive at market power conjectures, estimates λi are now discussed.  
He states that Λ is equal to 1 and represents the firm in question, in our case FJI.  
The λi’s are relative to FJI and are listed in table 1.  Here, FJI is the market leader 
because all λis are less than 1.  Powell states that firms could have a λi greater than 
1 (i.e. the firm in question is no longer the market leader).  Therefore, Lt is equal to 
.33 for FJI. 
 
Table 1: Relative Market Power Index 
Firm i  Index 
λ1  0.2700 
λ 2  0.2500 
λ 3 0.6 
λ 4  0.3600 
λ 5 0.5500 
 
 
Realized price in the simulation model is based on estimates of demand and supply 
elasticities.  Historical data on the ENER Juice market provides the necessary data 
for estimating demand and supply elasticities in the following regression equation: 
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where Pt is the price in period t;  S e ˆ is the parameter estimate of the elasticity of 
supply;  D e ˆ  is the parameter estimate of the elasticity of demand; Dt is the demand 
estimated from equation 2 above (i.e. Nt) for period t; St is supply which is a 
capacity measure based on the sum of λi in period t;  t ν  is the error term.  Since 
supply is a capacity measure, it is assumed that demand is met by all firms in the 
market.  The amount each firm supplies/produces is based on their market share. 
 
These prices are used for all firms and costs are estimated off the market leader’s 
average total cost function3.  These estimated costs are based on the λi of each firm.  
It is assumed that each λi accounts for an efficiency measure with the market leader 
being the most efficient.  Therefore, competing firms face a fraction of FJI’s average 
total cost function based on their λi.     
 
The final part of determining competitor entry is the decision rule of entry employed 
throughout the simulation.  Initially each firm faces a priori expectations of 
entering the market in the first year as described earlier.  Each subsequent year 
entry decision is based on the realization of the market size in the previous year, if 
there were potential short-run profits in the preceding period, and the assumption 




Simulation of the NPV model was implemented in the add-on package @Risk for 
Microsoft Excel.  NPV results converged after 5,000 iterations.  Correlation between 
market size, market share, and price was controlled for within the empirical 
distributions.  A 10-year period is simulated for the GE Juice market.  These results 
show the impact of a dominate firm’s entry, FJI, on the size of the market and the 
market share of FJI and its competitors.  After assessing the market impacts of 
introducing GE Juice, we use this information to identify the size of first-mover 
advantages in a market where a new product is introduced (i.e. waiting a year, 2 
years, etc. to enter the market when demand is ‘strong’).  Finally, we quantify the 
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net benefits of first-mover advantages for existing firms, use this as an indicator of 
market power, and as a barrier to entry for potentially innovative new firms.   
 
Market Size and Share 
 
Typically, Bass Models are applied to durable goods.  Although GE Juice is not a 
durable good, we feel that the proposed modified Bass Model does a good job in 
fitting the ENER Juice data.  This is based on the regression results received and 
the fact that the classic product life cycle is reproduced consistently in the 
simulation.  Remember that theN described earlier is interpreted as being total 
number of ENER Juice cases sold over its product life. 
 
Table 2 shows the results received from the Bass Model estimation of ENER Juice.  
An R2 of 0.9867 indicates that the Bass Model fits the data well.  In addition, the 
parameter coefficients are found to be statistically significant.  The coefficient θ 
represents the internal influence or the amount of diffusion within the marketplace 
of ENER Juice (i.e. word-of-mouth sales).  Since the ENER Juice data contains 
repeat sales, θ also captures repeat purchases of ENER Juice.  This may explain 
why θ is much larger than Φ (the external influence on people who have not 
adopted). 
Table 2: Bass Regression Model Results 
Coefficients Estimates 
Φ 0.0307 
   (0.0044) 
    
Θ 0.3061 
   (0.0171) 
    
R2 0.9867 
Notes: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses 
  2) Degrees of freedom are 13 
 
 
From this regression model, error terms are collected and an empirical distribution 
is created for the simulation of market size throughout time.  Because time is part 
of the simulation of market size, a moving average component is created which is 
based on the error distribution.  Figure 1 shows the fitted Bass Model product life 
cycle.  This model does indeed yield the classic product life cycle curve and the 
moving average component allows for the simulation of market size to not be mean 
reverting.  The point here is that we want to simulate multiple scenarios of 
potential cases of GE Juice sold over the product life cycle and the Bass Model 
accomplishes this. 
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Figure 1:  Estimated Bass Model from ENER Juice Data 
 
 
The market share regression is based on equation 3 described earlier.  Table 1 
shows the relative market power index of each competing firm relative to FJI (who 
is the market leader with an index equal to 1).  With these indices and the historical 
data of competitors, the market share decay parameter is estimated (β from 
equation 3).  The results of this regression yield a β equal to .3016 with a standard 
error of .0385 and the regression model has an R2 of .825.  This β variable enters the 
NPV simulation model and captures the rate at which a firm approaches its long-
term share.  A reason why a firm, including FJI, may not reach its long-term share 
immediately is consumer preferences or loyalty.  There is a switching cost involved 
with a consumer going to another firm’s product.    
 
Competitors’ Entry Decisions 
 
One of the most interesting results from the model is the competitors’ entry 
decisions.  In the model, we used FJI’s most informed estimates of the likelihood 
that competitors would enter.  They were certain that one firm (Firm 3) would 
introduce the new product immediately.  However, all of the other competitors were 
less likely to enter to varying degrees.  The a priori expectations served as the 
likelihood that any of the competitors would enter in period one.   
The competition’s decision in following years is more interesting (see Tables 3 -5).  
Now the entry decision by competitors is made contingent upon the potential to 
have earned a profit in the previous period.  The decision trigger for the ith firm is as 
follows: 
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If the realized market price-per-unit in the last period (Pt-1) is greater than the ith 
firm’s marginal cost in the last period (MCt-1, i), then the ith firm will enter the 
market.  It is further assumed that once the firm is in the market they do not exit.  
Marginal costs for competitors were modeled based on the relative competitiveness 
measure.  Thus, we would expect more firms to enter when the market size is large 
and fewer firms to enter when it is small.  The ability of the innovative firms (FJI 
and Firm 3) to bear the uncertainty regarding market size appears to serve as a 
barrier to entry/innovation for other less competitive firms.  These firms employ a 
delay strategy, waiting instead to see the realized market share. 
 
Table 3:  Competitors’ Simulated Entry Probability when Fresh Juice Inc. Enters in 
Year 1 
 Year 
Firm  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 10 
1  15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38% 0.69% 3.38% 43.19% 11.42% 3.77% 
2  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.50% 2.31% 48.42% 14.08% 4.35% 
3  100%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
4  5.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 1.23% 2.62% 8.38% 46.31% 11.38% 4.04% 
5  70.00% 1.96% 0.00% 0.81% 3.27% 4.50%  6.88% 9.42%  1.38% 0.58% 
Note:  It is assumed that once a competitor enters the market they do not exit. 
 
 
Table 4:  Competitors’ Simulated Entry Probability when Fresh Juice Inc. Enters in 
Year 2 
 Year 
Firm  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9  10 
1 15.00%  0.35%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.12%  7.73%  6.04% 3.46% 
2 0.00%  0.23%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.04%  7.92%  6.62% 2.54% 
3 100%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 
4 5.00%  2.85%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.04% 0.38% 10.27% 7.08% 2.81% 
5 70.00%  8.50%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.19% 0.85%  8.73%  3.35% 1.46% 
Note:  It is assumed that once a competitor enters the market they do not exit. 
 
 
Table 5: Competitors’ Simulated Entry Probability when Fresh Juice Inc. Enters in 
Year 3 
 Year 
Firm  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1 15.00%  22.85%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 4.58% 5.19% 3.19% 
2 0.00%  24.38%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 4.27% 6.62% 3.38% 
3 100%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 5.00%  27.65%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 6.12% 5.27% 4.12% 
5 70.00%  29.35%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 0.08% 0.04% 
Note:  It is assumed that once a competitor enters the market they do not exit. 
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For example, if FJI decides to enter into the market in year one (Table 3), then all 
other firms tend to delay entry until after year four.  Similarly, if FJI enters in year  
two (Table 4), then competitors tend to delay entry even longer, i.e. not until year 
eight.  A similar pattern emerges for the scenario when FJI delays its own entry 
until year three (Table 5).  
 
It is notable that when FJI (modeled as one of two market leaders and innovators) 
delays its production introduction two or even three years, weaker competitors are 
much more likely to enter in earlier years.  For example, when FJI introduces the 
product immediately then only Firm 5 has any appreciable probability of entry.  
This probability itself is less than 2%.  However, when FJI delays until year three, 




To quantify the first-mover advantages gained by FJI, it is useful to look at the 
simulation results regarding the different entry-year-scenarios (Table 6).  Clearly, 
entry in year one is the only profitable strategy.  If FJI delays entry until year 2, 3, 
or 4, the mean NPV for FJI is negative.  Furthermore, negative NPVs account for 
more than 75% of the simulated values when FJI decides to delay entry.  
 
Table 6: Net Present Value Model Results of Introducing GE Juice 
   Entry Year  Entry Year  Entry Year  Entry Year 
Statistics on Simulated NPV  1  2  3  4 
Mean $1,247,701    ($1,362,579) ($1,503,668) ($1,068,025) 
Standard Deviation  $1,745,178   $1,348,560   $1,594,390   $1,054,259  
5th  percentile  ($1,505,794) ($3,458,511) ($4,162,945) ($2,674,506) 
25th percentile  $81,203   ($2,289,440)  ($2,681,316)  ($2,039,413) 
75th percentile  $2,372,430   ($485,216)  ($285,312)  ($255,292) 
95th percentile  $4,254,431   $958,744   $616,772   $528,273  
 
 
A conservative estimate of the first-mover advantages for FJI would be the 
difference in the mean NPV in entering immediately (first-mover) and delaying 
until the 4th year.  Even in this scenario, these first-mover advantages amount to 
more than $2 million.  These can be attributed to greater market share captured 
due to delayed entry by these other competitors when FJI enters immediately.  
Delaying entry creates a situation where FJI must compete more aggressively to 




The model developed allows firms to apply their conjectures, historical data, and 
current data/market results to an investment decision.  This general approach 
emphasizes the flexibility of this type of analysis across a wide range of firms.  Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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However, particular focus was given to the incumbent firm having developed a 
product and seeing if it should launch this product.  We quantified this by looking at 
first-mover advantages and their magnitude relative to profits of the investment.  
Finally, it was of interest to see if we could create a barrier to innovation for FJI by 
moving first. 
 
We have used a scenario facing a firm in a relatively stable juice market to quantify 
first-mover advantages.  A well-developed simulation model suggests that first-
mover advantages are substantial, and are likely the result of competitors delaying 
entry in response to the innovator entering the market immediately.  These 
relatively large first-mover advantages ($2 million) show that if we do not move 
first in the market, existing firms will take the sales from us.  The delay by 
competition allows the innovator to capture valuable market share early and 
relatively easily.  This result supports Leiberman and Montgomery (1998) which 
indicate that one of the key drivers in the successes of pioneering firms is the ability 
to gear consumer preferences towards their products. 
 
These results demonstrate that the proposed methodology is a tool that managers 
can use to aid in their decision for bringing a new product to market.  Additional 
implications exist relative to the empirical results and how these results influence 
the decision process of a management team.  If careful analysis of the new product’s 
market including size, share, price, and competitor entry is thoroughly completed, 
then the management team can arrive at probabilistic estimates of first-mover 
advantages and assess the impact of these advantages on the firm’s bottom line.  It 
is important for a firm, when contemplating introduction of a new product, to 
consider the long-term profitability of the new product.  Our results indicate that 
launching GE Juice immediately yields an approximate 80% chance it will provide 
an economic profit to FJI.  Furthermore, we have demonstrated that immediate 
product introduction creates a delay strategy option for FJI’s competitors and 
growth option for FJI.  That is, FJI’s competitors wait-and-see how the uncertain 
GE juice market develops and enters when they can capture a profit for their 
respective firm.  In addition, FJI should enter the market immediately because the 
growth potential of immediate entry dominates the option of delaying entry.   
Finally, the proposed simulation model allows a firm’s management team the 
flexibility to implement multiple sensitivity analyses on variables that are pertinent 
to the success of a given firm (e.g. altering advertisement cost of the new product). 
 
A limitation of our study is that FJI is treated as being risk neutral.  A further 
extension of this model would be to incorporate a utility function to capture the 
characteristics of a risk averse firm.  In addition, our proposed model focuses on a 
firm with limited data.  More extensive data on competitor’s market power relative 
to FJI would enhance these measures beyond firm level conjectures.  However, this 
data can be difficult to collect or observe and the proposed model allows managers 
to make a more informed decision when bringing an innovative product to market. Briggeman, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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